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SEQRA'S SIBLINGS: PRECEDENTS FROM LITTLE 
NEPA'S IN THE SISTER STATES 
Nicholas A. Robinson* 
Most environmental degradation occurs incrementally and cumula- 
tively. The small homebuilder blacktops and covers a vacant lot, 
thereby increasing the flow of casual surface waters on other lots in 
the watershed; by itself the effect is not noticed, but when several 
, 
score of homebuilders repeat the event, flooding occurs downstream. 
The same is true of the isolated discharge of one smokestack's emis- 
sions into the atmosphere or the seemingly isolated filling of a small 
riverside marsh. When one road is sited, few see how it bisects a wild- 
life habitat or foresee how it triggers further new developments in its 
wake. 
Indeed, as the biologist Garret Hardin has observed, a person's ra- 
tional self-interest may usually be to exploit natural resources or 
property to the maximum extent possible without regard to the cu- 
mulative effect that ultimately inures to the detriment of the same 
person.' Even when a town arrests adverse trends within its jurisdic- 
tion: the gasoline alley or fast food strip often locates a t  the border 
of the town in greater or more troublesome concentrations than 
would have otherwise been the case. 
No single nostrum can establish a healthful and pleasing environ- 
ment. No statute can legislate a sound environment into existence. 
Rather, environmental quality will be the result of many isolated and 
discrete decisions, each one structured so as to avert environmental 
degradation. Progress in society can then be realized without the un- 
intended harm that might otherwise result. 
As Lord Eric Ashby puts it, human endeavor can become a sympa- 
thetic part of the natural envir~nment.~ In place of a conflict with 
nature brought on by pollution and other environmental harm, there 
can be a reconciliation of human society and nature. This becomes 
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. A.B., Brown University; J.D., 
Columbia University. In 1975, Professor Robinson sewed on the Environmental Advisory Task 
Force to Governor Hugh Carey which proposed the adoption of SEQRA to the Governor. 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
' See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359,285 N.E.2d 291,334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal 
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 1184 (1975). 
a E. ASHBY, RECONCILING MAN WITH THE ENVIRONMENT (1978). 
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possible "not by heroic long-term megadecision, but by the cumula- 
tive effect of wise medium-term microdecisions, each decision clarify- 
ing the shape of the decision that needs to follow."' 
The technique of environmental impact assessment has emerged as 
the principal regulatory tool for assuring that each person acts "so 
that due consideration is given to preventing environmental dam- 
age."6 Just as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)6 re- 
quires that each of the.federa1 government's agencies assure that its 
decisions will be environmentally sound, so have many of the various 
states decreed that their agencies and political subdivisions shall 
maximize environmental protection. 
I. NEPA's PROGENY: SEQRA's SIBLINGS 
New York's State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)' is 
ably described throughout this Symposium. It mandates that New 
York governmental units "conduct their affairs with an awareness 
that they are stewards of the air, water, land and living resources, 
and that they have an obligation to protect the environment for the 
use and enjoyment of this and all future  generation^."^ 
In adopting SEQRA in 1975, New York joined a number of states 
that had followed the lead of Congress in enacting NEPA.@ The state 
environmental policy acts, often referred to as "little NEPA's," oc- 
cassionally copy NEPA almost verbatim.1° Most, however, make ex- 
tensive adaptations ranging from the Michigan Environmental Pro- 
tection Act, adopted contemporaneously with NEPA, which makes 
unlawful the "pollution, impairment or destruction of the air, water 
' Id. at 87. 
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW $ 8-0103(9) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). For a discussion o f  
the quality and extent o f  "due consideration," see Ulasewicz, The Department of Environmen- 
tal Conservation and SEQRA: Upholding its Mandates and Charting Parameters for the Elu- 
sive Socio-Economic Assessment, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1255 (1982). 
42 U.S.C. $ 4321-4369 (1976). For further NEPA details see Orloff,  SEQRA: New York's 
Reformation of NEPA, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1128 (1982). 
' N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW $ 5  8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). For back- 
ground on SEQRA, see Marsh, Introduction-SEQRA's Scope and Objectives, 46 ALB. L. REV. 
1097 (1982). 
' N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 5 8-0103(8) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). See Marsh, supra 
note 7 ,  at 1104. 
1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 612. See also Orloff, supra note 6 ,  at 1129. 
'O See, e.g., Montana Environmental Policy Act, MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §$ 69-6501 to -6517 
(1971) (current version at id. $$ 75-1-101 to  -324 (1981)); Public Policy Environmental Act, P. 
R. LAWS ANN.  tit. 12, $ 5  1121-1140 (1970) (current version at id. $8  1121-1142 (1978 & Supp. 
1980)). 
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or other natural resources or the public trust therein" unless there 
are no prudent and feasible alternatives," to states with statutes that 
require an environmental impact assessment by executive order of 
the governor for selected actions only.la 
Most of the twenty-eight jurisdictions that have little NEPA re- 
quirements incorporate the same administrative procedures as does 
the federal environmental impact statement (EIS) process.lS For this 
reason, there is considerable borrowing of case law and interpretation 
from one state to another. A common body of law guides the EIS 
process in whatever jurisdiction it comes to be adopted. 
In this manner, the EIS process enjoys' a status similar to a uni-. 
form state law such as the Uniform Commercial Code. When a ques- 
tion arises as to which types of alternatives should be examined in an 
EIS, guidance can be found in federal decisions under NEPA, or in 
leading cases under. little NEPA's such as the California Environ- 
mental Quality Act (CEQA)14 and Washington's State Environmental 
Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA).16 
There are currently twenty-eight jurisdictions with an EIS require- 
ment. Fifteen states and Puerto Rico have enacted comprehensive 
laws like NEPA.16 Michigan has a law more substantial than NEPA, 
MICH. STAT. ANN. 8 14.528(205)(2) (Callaghan 1980). For text of the full Thomas J. Ander- 
son, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 1970, see MICH. STAT. ANN. $8 
14.528(201) - .528(207) (Callaghan 1980). 
la See, e.g., Exec. Order of April 23, 1971 (Hawaii); Exec. Order No. 53 (N.J. 1973); Admin. 
Order No. 33 (N.J. 1973). Hawaii has since enacted an EIS statute. See HAWAII REV. STAT. 88 
343-1 to -8 (Supp. 1980). 
'"2 U.S.C. 8 4332(2)(c) (1976). See generally, [I9791 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
ANN. REP., ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 591, 595-602. 
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 88 21000-21176 (Deering 1976 & Supp. 1982) (the uniform require- 
ment for all California state agencies, boards and commissions). 
ID WASH. REV. CODE $8 43.21C.010-.910 (Supp. 1981). 
le The current versions of the statutes for these jurisdictions are as follows: California, see 
California Environmental Policy Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE $8 21000-21176 (Deering 1976 & 
Supp. 1982); Connecticut, see Connecticut Environmental Policy Act of 1973, CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. $8 22a-1 to -7 (Supp. 1974-1975); Hawaii, see Governor's Executive Order of August 21, 
1974, as supplemented by HAWAII REV. STAT. $8 343-1 to -8 (Supp. 1980); Indiana, see IND. 
CODE ANN. $8 13-1-10-1 to -8 (Burns 1981); Maryland, see Maryland Environmental Policy Act 
of 1973, MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. $8 1-301 to -305 (1974 & Supp. 1981); Massachusetts, see 
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30, $8 61-62H (MichieLaw 
Coop. 1973 & Supp. 1981); Minnesota, see Minnesota Environmental Policy Act of 1973, MINN. 
STAT. ANN. $8 116D.01-.07 (1977 & Supp. 1981); Montana, see MONT. REV. CODES ANN. $8 75-1- 
101 to -324 (1981); North Carolina, see North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971, N.C. 
GEN. STAT. $8 113A-1 to -10 (1978); South Dakota, see South Dakota Environmental Policy 
Act, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 85 34A-9-1 to -13 (1977 & Supp. 1981); Virginia, see Virginia 
Environmental Quality Act, VA. CODE $8 10-107.107-.112, 10-177 to -186 (1978 & Supp. 1981); 
Washington, see State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 38 
43.21C.010-.910 (Supp. 1981), as supplemented by 1981 Wash. Laws chs. 278 & 290, Wisconsin, 
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and New Mexico, which had a little NEPA, repealed it after a short 
time.17 Four states have promulgated comprehensive executive orders 
establishing procedures equivalent to the EIS functi~n. '~ Nine states 
have established an EIS function for specified limited purposes.le 
Courts in states with legislatively enacted little NEPA's look to 
federal case law for authority and guidance by analogy in construing 
their state act.a0 There is also a growing literature in the law reviews 
about the operation of these state laws;a1 this body of commentary is 
see Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WIS. STAT. ANN. $ 1.11 (Supp. 1981-1982); 
Puerto Rico, see Public Policy Environmental Act, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12, 58 1121-1142 (1978 
& Supp. 1980). 
l7 Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. STAT. ANN. $5 14.528(201)- 
.528(207) (Callaghan 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. $5 12-20-1 to -7 (Supp. 1973), repealed by 1973 
N.M. Laws ch. 46. Regarding the repeal of the New Mexico statute, see Comment, The Rbe 
and Demise of the New Mexico Environmental Quality Act, "Little NEPA," 14 NAT. Rm. J. 
401 (1974). 
These four states, with their executive orders and implementing regulations, are as follows: 
Michigan, see Michigan Executive Directive 1971-10, as superseded by Michigan Executive Or- 
der '1973-9, as superseded by Michigan Order 1974-4 (May 1974); New Jersey, see New Jersey 
Executive Order No. 53 (Oct. 15, 1973); Texas, see Policy for the Environment (Mar. 7, 1972), 
published in Environment for Tomorrow: The Texas Response, updated by The Environment 
Policy-Guidelines and Procedures for Processing EIS's, (Nov. 1975); Utah, see State of Utah 
Executive Order (Aug. 27, 1974). 
'O The states with environmental impact assessment processes limited in scope are the fol- 
lowing: Arizona, see Game and Fish Commission Policy of July 2, 1971, see also Memorandum 
by the Arizona Game and Fish Commission, Requirements for Environmental Impact State- 
ments (June 9, 1971); Delaware, see Coastal Zone Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, $$ 7001-7003 
(1974, Supp. 1980 & Interim Supp. 1981); The Tidal Wetlands Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, $5 
6601-6620 (1974); Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. $5 95A-101 to -1306a (1976 & Supp. 1981); Ken- 
tucky, see KY. REV. STAT. $ 278.025 (1981); Mississippi, see Coastal Wetlands Protection Law, 
MISS. CODE ANN. 56 49-27-1 to -69 (Supp. 1981); Nebraska, see N~RASKA DEP'T OF ROADS, 
ACTION PLAN (1973), as revised by, NEBRASKA DEP'T OP ROADS, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLAN 
(1975); Nevada, see NEV. R&v. STAT. $5 321.610-.770 (1979); New Jersey, see Coastal Area Facil- 
ity Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. $8 1319-1 to -21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981-1982); The Wet- 
lands Act of 1970, N.J. STAT. ANN. $$ 139A-1 to -10 (West 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. s 12:s-3 
(West 1979); Rhode Island, see Rhode Island Environmental Righta Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS $ 10- 
20-8(b) (Supp. 1981). 
'O See, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 260-61, 502 P.2d 1049, 
1057-58, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761,769-70 (1972); People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830,841, 
115 Cal. Rptr. 67, 75 (1974); Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Aesocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 
2d 475,513 P.2d 36 (1973); Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 69 
Wis. 2d 1, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975). See abo  Secretary of Envtl. Affairs v. Massachusetts Port 
Auth., 366 Mass. 755, 323 N.E.2d 329 (1975); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Min- 
nesota Envtl. Quality Council, 306 Minn. 370, 237 N.W.2d 376 (1975); Town of Henrietta v. 
Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 220, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445 (1980); 
H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 231, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 
(1979). 
" On little NEPA's generally, see note 16 supra. See ako  [I9771 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY ANN. REP., ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 119-21, 130-35; Hagman, NEPA's Progeny In- 
habit the States- Were the Genes Defective?, 7 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1974); Pridgeon, Anderson & 
Delphey, State Environmental Policy Acts: A Survey of Recent Developments, 2 HARV. ENVTL. 
Heinonline - -  46 Alb. L. Rev. 1158 1981-1982 
SEQRA 
of increasing value to bench and bar,alike.aa 
New York's SEQRA was adopted at least four years after the fed- 
eral, California and Washington statutes. Because of precedent from 
these other jurisdictions,. there was no question in New York about 
applying SEQRA to private projects requiring a state permit, as had 
L. REV. 419 (1977); Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environmental Policy Acts, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(ENVTL. L. INST.) ll 50,090 (1973); Note, Emerging State Programs To Protect the Environ- 
ment: "Little NEPA's" and Beyond, 5 ENVTL. AFFAIRS 567 (1976); Comment, 6 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(ENVTL.  INST.) ll 10,216 (1976); Comment, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL.  INST.) ll 10,187 (1977). 
Note, State Environmental Impact Statements, 15 Washburn L.J. 64 (1976). 
" For articles on California's law, see Hildreth, Environmental Impact Under the California 
Environmental Quality Act: The Reports: New Legal Framework, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 
(1977); Lynch, The 1973 CEQ Guidelines: Cautious Updating of the Environmental Impact 
Statement Process, Comment, 11 CALIF. W.L. REV. 297 (1975); Comment, Substantive Enforce- 
ment of the California Environmental Quality Act, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 112 (1981) [hereinafter 
cited as Substantive Enforcement]; Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: A Project for the Califor- 
nia Environmental Control Act?, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 777 (1979); Note, California Envi- 
ronmental Quality Act and Eminent Domain: Failure to Comply with CEQA as a Defense to 
Condemnation, 8 Lou. L.A. L. REV. 734 (1975); Note, Controlled Burning of Rangeland in 
California: Should CEQA Apply?, 11 U.C.D.L. Rev. 649 (1978); Note, Environmental Decision 
Making Under CEQA: A Quest for Uniformity, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 838 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Quest for Uniformity]; Environmental Law Symposium, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 513 
(1979). For articles on Florida's statute, see Comment, Environmental Law: The Inapplicabil- 
ity of the Special Injury Rule to the Florida Environmental Protection Act, 33 U. h a .  L. REV. 
425 (1981). For commentary on the Michigan law, see Note, PBB Action Committee v. DNR: 
The Feasible and Prudent Alternative Argument Under the Michigan Environmental Protec- 
tion Act, 1979 DET. C.L. REV. 457; Comment, New Growth in Michigan's Environmental Pro- 
tection Act: State Supreme Court Enjoins Oil Development in Wilderness, 9 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(ENVTL. . INST.) ll 10,144 (1979). For a discussion of Minnesota's statute, see Research Project, 
An Assessment of the Minnesota Environmental Impact Statement Process, 3 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 63 (1980); Note, Environmental Law: Minnesota Environmental Policy Act, 4 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 238 (1978). For an analysis of the Montana law, see Tobias & McLean, Of 
Crabbed Interpretations and Frustrated Mandates: The Effect of Environmental Policy Acts 
on Pre-existing Agency Authority, 41 MONT. L. REV. 177, 234-67 (1980). For commentary on 
New York's statute, see Manes, Alice in the Wonderland of S.E.Q.R., 52 N.Y.S.B.J. 115 (1980); 
Nichols & Robinson, A Primer on New York's Revolutionized Environmental Laws: Part I, 49 
N.Y.S.B.J. 41 (1977); Robinson, Update on State-Impact Review Laws, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 26, 
1980, at 1, col. 1; Sandler, State Environmental Quality Review Act, 49 N.Y.S.B.J. 110 (1977); 
Weinberg, What Every Real Estate Lawyer Should Know About New York's SEQRA, 52 
N.Y.S.B.J. 114 (1980); Note, New York State Environmental Quality ~ev i ew  Act: An Overview 
and Analysis, 41 ALB. L. REV. 23 (1977). For a discussion of the Washington statute, see Roe & 
Lean, The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 'cmd Its 1973 Amendments, 49 WASH. L. 
REV. 583 (1973); Comment, Judicial Review of Compliance with the State Environmental Pol- 
icy Act of 1971: Recent Developments, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 803 (1975); Comment The 1974 
Amendments to Washington's State Environmental Policy Act, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 787 (1975); 
Note, Threshold Determination of the State Environmental Policy Act: Washington Adopts a 
More Flexible Approach-Equitable Remedies: Laches Defense Restricted, 56 WASH. L. REV. 
549 (1981); Note, A Standard for Judicial Review of Administrative Decisionmaking Under 
SEPA, 54 WASH. L. REV. 693 (1979). For a commentary on Wisconsin's law, see Special Project, 
Agency Decisionmaking Under the Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, 1977 WIS.  L. REV. 
111 [hereinafter cited as Wisconsin Environmental Policy]. 
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been litigated in the seminal California decision in Friends of Mam- 
moth o. Board of S u p e r ~ i s o r s . ~ ~  There was also no question that the 
EIS duty was a serious and fundamental administrative responsibil- 
ity, as described in the federal ruling in Culvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Commit!ee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commi~s ion .~~  
CEQA had already been amended once by the time New York en- 
acted SEQRA. When it did so, New York was able to benefit from 
the experiences of California and twelve other states with little 
NEPA'S.'~ 
The legislature actively considered this corpus of jurisprudence 
when it shaped SEQRA.s6 The actual operations under the California 
Act were described to the legislature by the chief of that state's Office 
of Environmental Protection, Nicholas Yost." Reports from other 
states were solicited and reviewed.as Assemblyman Oliver Koppel ex- 
pressed New York's debt to California on the eve of SEQRA's taking 
effect June 1, 1976, as follows: 
Fortunately, we do have substantial information in the experience of 
California, a state which has had such a law since 1970. The states 
have much in common, apart from the fact that much of the New York 
act is patterned on the earlier California model. Both states are large, 
populous and diverse. . . .¶@ 
8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). 
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
The states that had an EIS requirement in 1975 were California, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota, Vir- 
ginia, Washington and Wisconsin. See note 16,supra. 
See Koppell, Environmental Protection Laws At Issue, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1976, a t  1, col. 2 
(an essay by the chairman of the New York State Assembly Environmental Conservation 
Committee). 
'' Id. Mr. Yost later became general counsel to the President's Council on Environmental 
Quality in the administration of President Carter. 
2 V d .  (citing Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs and Virginia Council 
on the Environment reporta on the number of environmental impact reports and the time used 
in considering those reports). 
le Id. Assemblyman Koppell further observed that: 
According to Nicholas C. Yost, Deputy Attorney General in charge of the environmen- 
tal unit of the Attorney General's Office in California, the California experience is that 
environmental reporting has worked, and worked well. There were fears of opening the 
flood gates of litigation. These fears have not materialized. Mr. Yost reported that with 
over 400 cities in California and 58 counties, plus several hundred special districts and 
all of the agencies of State government, the Attorney General's records indicated some 
approximately 103 suits since 1970-an average of something over twenty suite a year. 
A report of the California Attorney General's office indicated that California's environ- 
mental impact reporting statute has not been "a vehicle for delay or frustration of 
projects on nonmeritorious grounds." The Attorney General's report concluded, that 
both in overall numerical terms and in relation to the number of agencies implementing 
their environmental consulting firm, confirms this conclusion (sic) . . . . 
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Indeed, shortly after the adoption of SEQRA, commentators were al- 
ready citing California precedents to assist in the proper interpreta- 
tion of SEQRA.SO In like vein, the Practising Law Institute provided 
a continuing legal education course in 1978 on SEQRA featuring the 
California and Washington statutes, along with NEPA, as principal 
sources of authority for construing SEQRA.sl As observed by Profes- 
sor Phillip Weinberg, who was in charge of the Environmental Pro- 
tection Bureau in the New York State Attorney General's Office a t  
the time of SEQRA's enactment: 
SEQRA had as its model [NEPA], which since January 1, 1970 has 
required every federd agency performing, permitting or funding any 
major action with a substantial impact on the environment to weigh 
the environmental effects of its action and to prepare an environmental 
impact statement-to look, in short, before it leaps, or permits some- 
one else to. Even more in point, a number of states, notably California 
and Washington, had also enacted environmental impact laws with 
parallel mandates. Our Legislature adapted these laws to New York's 
needs, requiring the state, localities and private businesses acting 
under state or local permit or funding to consider the impact of their 
action on the environment and to document that consideration by fur- 
nishing a reviewable record.8P 
The teaching of these authorities is obvious. Both the bench and 
bar should examine the case law under little NEPA's in other states 
before "recreating the wheel" in New York. In some instances, New 
York ought not to follow case law from a sister state. The provisions 
of SEQRA may be so different as to make the authority inapplicable. 
Similarly, the ruling may be inadequate to the needs of New York. 
In general, the fear of increased litigation, as reviewed above, is believed not to be well 
founded. It should be noted that the experience from other states, particularly Califor- 
nia, is that there simply has not been the degree of litigation stemming from environ- 
mental reporting which was originally feared. In light.of its stringent rule protecting 
administrative decisions, . . . New York is no more likely than California to have excee- 
sive litigation. 
Similarly, with respect to reporting delays and costa, studies from Maesachwetta and 
California do not appear to suggest that either will be inordinate. If the SEQR Act ia 
properly implemented at  the State and local agency levels, ita procedures can and should 
be carried out with and at  the same time as other requirements of planning, with mini- 
mum delay, if a t  all, and with expense commensurate with other necessary planning 
costs and not excessive in light of the importance of assuring that the future growth of 
the state is properly planned in the intereata of both a prosperow and livable state. 
Id. .at 4 (footnotes omitted). 
SO Sandler, supra note 22, a t  115-16. 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW COMPLIANCE: A PRAC- 
TICAL APPROACH AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL (J. Sache ed. 1978). 
'' Weinberg, supra note 22, a t  120 (citations omitted). 
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Whether or not this analogous case law is followed, however, it 
should at least be considered. 
The strength which a common body of law possesses is the intellec- 
tual force and perception of each decision's ratio decidendi; espe- 
cially in rulings of first impression, the advocate and judge should at 
least examine prior rulings of the key states having statutes substan- 
tially similar to SEQRA. Since the environmental problems them- 
selves are apt to be similar from state to state, and since commercial 
activity most often has interstate characteristics, society is best 
served by promoting a common pattern of environmental impact as- 
sessment. This will lead to predictabilty and shared expectations, 
strengthening both an ordered society with the rule of law and envi- 
ronmental protection. 
It is beyond the scope, and probably capacity, of this Article to 
identify every possible issue under SEQRA for which authority may 
be found in a sister state. Nonetheless, it may be instructive to illus- 
trate how analogous case law from other states may be drawn upon to 
further SEQRA.88 Obviously, other states may be drawn upon to fur- 
ther SEQRA. The little NEPA precedents may most usefully be 
sought not in the context of state agency actions which are often 
analogous to federal agency actions; rather, the state rulings are most 
valuable in construing the duties of villages, towns, cities, counties 
and other political subdivisions of a state. Two examples can demon- 
strate these matters. The first concerns the realm of the stewardship 
which the little NEPA's require. The second involves the details of 
the environmental impact assessment process itself. 
A. Ethics and Stewardship 
One leading case under SEQRA is Tuxedo Conservation and Tax- 
payers Association u. Town Board.84 In Tuxedo, the town board had 
final SEQRA approval authority over a 200 million dollar project, 
which would quadruple the town's pop~lation.~' One town trustee 
" Aa well, the large body of federal case law under NEPA should be examined closely. See 
Orloff, supra note 6. 
96 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 69 A.D.2d 320, 418 N.Y.S.2d 638 
(1979). 
a6 Id. at 7, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 671. 
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was an officer of an advertising agency, employed by the developer 
parent co rpora t i~n .~~  He refused to disqualify himself, however, and 
cast the decisive vote despite the probability of his firm's financial 
intere~t.~'  Although no ethics statutes had been violated, both trial 
and appellate courts in Tuxedo rigorously condemned the trustee's 
action and invalidated the project approval.88 
The Tuxedo decision held the town board trustee to the standard 
of "the punctilio of an honor the most sen~i t ive ,"~~ in the context of 
SEQRA decisions as "stewards of the air, water, land, and living re- 
sources" with "an obligation" to "this and all future generation~.'"~ 
About the same time as Tuxedo, the courts in California were reach- 
ing a different view. A badly divided California Supreme Court in 
Woodland Hills Residents Associations v. City Counci141 failed to in- 
sist upon the punctilio of honor. The court held that campaign con- 
tributions to city council members do not prevent them from decid- 
ing matters involving  contributor^.^^ Finding no literal violation of 
the statute, the court refused to imply a violation from the circum- 
stance~. '~ Thus, the court ignored even "the amount of the contribu- 
tion, its timing, its method, as well as the significance of the issue 
being conhidered . . . in judging the appearance of biasmW4' 
I t  may be that the unfortunate recent legislative criticisms of the 
California Supreme Court have cast it into a timid mold. The Califor- 
nia court's deference to the legislature,' in the face of "the mother's 
milk of politics"46 (that is, campaign contributions to CEQA deci- 
sionmakers), does little to ensure a full measure of environmental 
8e Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Ass'n. v. Town Bd., 69 A.D.2d 320,323,418 N.Y.S.2d 
638, 639 (1979). 
Id. The court noted that the trustee had knowingly participated and had even requested a 
local committee's ethics opinion. Id. a t  323, 418 N.Y.S.2d a t  639-40. 
" "For, like Caesar's wife, a public official must be above suspicion." Id. a t  324,418 N.Y.S.2d 
at  640. The trial court expressed a similar view: "Considering the scope of thii application 
(1,500 acres, 3,900 units and one fifth of a billion dollars), only the naive would not suspect that 
there could be tacit business pressures conflicting with the right of the public to a fair hearing." 
Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Bd., 96 Misc. 2d 1, 10, 408 N.Y.S.2d 668, 
673 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 69 A.D.2d 320, 418 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1979). 
Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Bd., 69 A.D.2d 320,324,418 N.Y.S.2d 
638, 640 (1979) (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Car- 
dozo, C.J.)). 
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 8 8-0103(8) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). 
41 26 Cal. 3d 938, 609 P.2d 1029, 164 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1980). 
4s Id. at 947, 609 P.2d a t  1033, 164 Cal. Rptr. at  259. 
" Id. at 946-47, 609 P.2d a t  1032-33, 164 Cal. Rptr. at  259. 
Id. at 951-52, 609 P.2d at  1036, 164 Cal. Rptr. a t  262 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dis- 
senting). 
46 26 Cal. 3d at  953, 609 P.2d a t  1037, 164 Cal. Rptr. a t  264 (Newman, J., concurring). 
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protection. CEQA lacks the express stewardship intent of SEQRA,'6 
and that may also explain the difference. Perhaps the public policy 
in California is to favor "political influence" in quasi-judicial 
A comparable situation in the State of Washington, however, 
would be resolved as in New York. Washington's little NEPA tracks 
the policies of NEPA, and establishes a stewardship role for govern- 
ment as to nature. All agencies of the state are urged to "[fjulfill the 
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for 
succeeding generations."4s Moreover, the Washington legislature has 
recognized "that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right 
to a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility 
to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environ- 
ment."4e In establishing this policy, Washington goes beyond 
Compare CM,. PUB. RES. CODE 8 21100 (Deering 1981) with N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 
8-0101 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The California statute provides: 
All state agencies, boards, and commissions shall prepare, or cause to be prepared by 
contract, and certify the completion of an environmental impact report on any project 
they propose to carry out or approve which may have a significant effect on t v  environ- 
ment. Such a report shall include a detailed statement setting forth the following: 
(a) The significant environmental effects of the proposed project. 
(b) Any significant environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the project is 
implemented. 
(c) Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the significant environmental effects in- 
cluding, but not limited to, measures to reduce wasteful, inefficient, and unnecessary 
consumption of energy. 
(d) Alternatives to the proposed project. 
(e) The relationship between local short-term.uees of man's environment and the main- 
tenance and enhancement of long-term productivity. 
(f) Any significant irreversible environmental changes which would be involved in the 
proposed project should it be implemented. 
(g) The growth-inducing impact of the proposed project. 
The report shall also contain a statement briefly indicating the reasons for determining 
that various effects of a project are not significant and consequently have not been dis- 
cussed in detail in the environmental impact report. 
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 8 21100 (Deering 1981). The New York Legislature expressed SEQRA's 
purpose as follows: 
It is the purpose of this act to declare a state policy which will encourage productive 
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and enhance human and community 
resources; and to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems, natural, human and 
community resources important to the people of the state. 
N.Y. ENTL. CONSERV. LAW 8 8-0101 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). 
'' See Note, Woodland Hills v. City Council of Los Angeles: Electoral Politics and Quasi- 
Judicial Fairness, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1098, 1123 (1981). 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8 43.21c.O20(2)(a) (Supp. 1981), as supplemented by 1981 Wash. 
Laws chs. 278 & 290. See Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 
84 Wash. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974) (en banc). 
'O WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8 43.21c.020(3) (1981), as supplemented by 1981 Wash. Laws chs. 
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NEPA.60 
The judiciary in Washington, as in New York, has properly identi- 
fied its role in examining impropriety and the appearance of impro- 
priety. Several cases offer guidance for municipal officials as to both 
ethics and environmental  stewardship^.^' In varied contexts, the 
Washington judiciary has developed the "appearance of fairness" 
ethical standard for land use decision.6a In Chrobuck u. Snohomish 
County,53 the Washington Supreme Court considered the rezoning of 
an area from a rural-residential to heavy industrial district. The 
court recognized that the denial of cross-examination, provision of 
trips paid for by the developer to similar plant sites as well as free 
entertainment, and prior membership in an organization with a 
financial interest in the project were cumulative circumstances con- 
demned as casting "an aura of infl~ence."~ In Buell v. City of 
B r e m e r t ~ n , ~ ~  the court focused on the single "infecting" circumstance 
of a board member with a financial interest in the project.5e Even 
prior or subsequent connections with the project or project sponsor 
have been condemned as violating the duty to reach and appear to 
reach an unbiased deci~ion.~' Further, in Fleming v. City of Ta- 
278 & 290. 
60 42 U.S.C. 8 4331 (1976) embodies Congress' national environmental policy. Unlike the 
Washington statute, it does not purport to create any individual rights. 
SAVE a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) 
(en banc); Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976) (en banc); Narrow- 
sview Preservation Assoc. v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974) (en banc); 
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292,502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en banc); Anderson v. Island 
Co., 81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972) (en banc); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 
518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (en banc); Chrobuck v. Snohomish Co., 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 
489 (1971) (en banc). The New York trial court's opinion in Tuxedo cited Chrobuck with ap- 
proval. Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Bd., 96 Misc. 2d 1,10,408 N.Y.S.2d 
668, 673 (1978), aff'd, 69 A.D.2d 320, 418 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1979). 
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en banc); Anderson v. 
Island Co., 81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972) (en banc); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 
Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (en banc); Chrobuck v. Snohomish Co., 78 Wash. 2d 858, 
480 P.2d 489 (1971) (en banc). 
78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971) (en banc). 
Id. a t  862-70, 480 P.2d at  492-96. In Fleming u. City of Tacoma, the Washington court 
characterized the facts of the Chrobuck case as revealing that there were "close prior social and 
business connections with a proponent of the rezone and [that] his successor had publicly sup- 
ported the proponent's position." Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 296-97, 502 
P.2d 327, 330 (1972) (en banc). 
66 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (en banc). 
" According to' the court, "the self-interest of one member of the planning commission in- 
fects the action of the other members of the commission regardless of their disinterestedness." 
Id. at  525, 495 P.2d at  1362. 
See, e.g., Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 299-300, 502 P.2d 327,.331 (1972) 
(en banc) (subsequent employment); Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wash. 2d 312, 325-27, 501 
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coma,68 post-decision employment of a council member by the project 
sponsor's attorney, and in Anderson v. Island County," the biased 
participation of a former owner of the property, caused the courts to 
rescind both the ordinance and the reclassification. Although no 
wrongdoing was found in any of these cases, the Washington Su- 
preme Court held that the importance of public trust and confidence 
mandated that even the appearance of impropriety be avoided.80 
This stringent standard was interwoven with the requirements of 
environmental stewardship in local bond use decisions in SAVE a 
Valuable Environment v. B~thel l ,~ '  Swift v. Island County,8a and 
Narrowsview Preservation Association u. City of T a ~ o r n a . ~ ~  Inade- 
quate environmental review and financially interested board mem- 
bers caused the Swift and SAVE courts to void both local zoning 
 change^.^ In Narrowsview, although the environmental review was 
adequate, the court found that the participation of a financially in- 
terested board member tainted the zoning a p p r o ~ a l . ~ T h e  continuing 
scrutiny of the Washington judiciary under the "appearance of fair- 
ness" standard encourages fair and impartial land use decisions 
which fulfill the responsibility of each citizen to preserve and en- 
hance the envir~nment .~~ 
P.2d 594, 602 (1972) (en banc) (prior ownership of property). 
" 81 Wash. 2d 292, 300, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972) (en banc). The employment was entered 
into less than 48 hours after the crucial vote. Id. The trial court observed: 
The time coincidence is devastating. I t  is unfortunate this probably has taken place be- 
cause this was one of those days that we all have where a problem arose and a man just 
didn't think about the whole implications of what he was doing. The appearance of con- 
flict of interest is here. The appearance of conflict of interest is so strong that I am sure 
those who oppose the zoning and who thought this thing through will never, never be- 
lieve that somehow this wasn't kind of wired before the final vote was taken. 
Id. a t  300, 502 P.2d a t  332. 
81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972) (en banc). 
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en banc); Anderson v. 
Island County, 81 Wash. 2d 312,501 P.2d 594 (1972) (en banc); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 
Wash. 2d 518,495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (en banc); Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d a t  
858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971) (en banc). 
*I 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) (en banc). 
" 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976) (en banc). 
84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974) (en banc). 
" In Swift, there was no environmental review and in SAVE, there was no mitigation of 
adverse environmental effects. SAVE a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 
862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) (en banc); Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 
(1976) (en banc). 
'' Narrowsview Preservation Assoc. v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416,526 P.2d 897 (1974) 
(en banc). The tainted board member was an employee, whose employer would be directly 
affected by the decision. Id. 
" WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8 43.21 C.020(3) (Supp. 1981), as supplemented by 1981 Wash. 
Laws chs. 278 & 290. 
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Taken seriously, the legislative mandate for stewardship is akin to 
the common law duty of a trustee to avoid waste. The trustee owes 
all allegiance to the public, present and future, to conserve and best 
manage the resources at issue. This task, as New York and Washing- 
ton concur, is incompatible with even the appearance of a conflict ,of 
interest. 
B. EIS Procedure 
The heart of SEQRA and all of the little NEPA's is the environ- 
mental impact statement process. This is the "action forcing" ele- 
ment which makes the stewardship role realistic and p r a c t i ~ a l . ~ ~  It is 
this process which admits of a shared common law among the little 
NEPA's. The key stages of the SEQRA procedures can be construed 
in light of the analogous rulings of other jurisdictions. In like vein, 
New York's growing case law is becoming a part of the body of au- 
thority available to assist other jurisdictions. 
Six principal steps characterize the EIS process. Initially, there is 
the threshold question of whether or not SEQRA applies to a given 
ac t i~n ."~  Second is the lead agency de~ignation.~~ Third is the nega- 
tive declaration or the finding of a Type I action requiring prepara- 
tion of an environmental impact statement.70 Fourth is the prepara- 
tion of the draft EIS (DEIS) and review of  alternative^.^^ Fifth is the 
preparation of the final EIS (FEIS) and full identification of impacts 
and their possible mitigation.la Finally, there is judicial review of this 
O7 There is ample commentary on the action-forcing element of 8 102(2)(C) of NEPA and the 
little NEPA's. See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, EPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OP THE NA- 
TIONAL. ENVIRONMENTAL PO ICY ACT (1973); R. LIROFP, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRON- 
MENT (1976). 
" Concerning actions, see 6 N.Y.C.R.R. 8 617.2(b) (1979). See also Marsh, supra note 7, a t  
1099-100,1106-09. 
'O "When an action is to be carried out or approved by two or more agencies, the determina- 
tion of whether the action may have a significant effect on the environment shall be made by 
the lead agency having principal responsibility for carrying out or approving such action and 
such agency shall prepare, or cause to be prepared . . . the environmental impact statement." 
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 8 8-0111(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Concerning lead agency 
designation, see 6 N.Y.C.R.R. 8 617.6 (1979). Aa to one agency and as to more than one agency, 
see id. 4 617.2(c) &(d). 
70 A negative declaration is a decision not to prepare on EIS because the proposed action will 
not have a significant effect on the environment. Id. 8 617.12(a). The significance of an action ie 
determined under criteria set forth in id. 8 617.10(c); the negative declaration for nonsignificant 
acts appears in id. 8 617.10(b). 
The required contents of a DEIS are governed by id. 5 617.14(d). On alternatives, see id. 8 
617.14(f). 
7s The FEIS contains the comments on the DEIS and the final analysis. Id. $8 617.8 & 
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process along with the final agency decision itself and the resolution 
of who has standing to seek review.?)' 
Although there is little case law concerning SEQRA's EIS proce- 
dure to rely on, references can be usefully drawn from California and 
Washington. Because the little NEPA's from these two states were 
models from which SEQRA was in part adapted," the judicial glosses 
on their state environmental impact assessment process are apt 
sources to guide the evolution of SEQRAY6 
1. Whether the EIS Process Applies to a Given Action 
Much rides on the initial decision that an action requires an EIS. 
Failure to undertake the EIS process frustrates SEQRA's steward- 
ship and courts will enjoin actions seeking to circumvent the Act.?@ 
The validity of subsequent permits may be subject to invalidati~n.~~ 
Several early New York cases ratified exemptions from the SEQRA 
Where facts of the underlying action manifestly constituted 
a Type I action under SEQRA, the cases favoring exemptions appear 
to be wrongly decided;?@ the rule of reason and remedial purposes of 
SEQRA militate that actions not be exempted.s0 
The logic of California's Friends of Mammoth decisione1 should 
617.14(h). Mitigation must be shown a t  this time. Id. 5 617.9(~)(2). 
78 Final agency action is the approval or disapproval step which occurs 30 days after the 
FEIS is filed. Id. 5 617.9(b). Judicial review is available under article 78 of the CPLR. N.Y. CIV. 
PRAC. LAW 5 7800-7806 (McKinney 1981). 
74 This Article is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise of the commentary on each of 
these six steps from each of the nineteen states which have little NEPA's akin to SEQRA. See 
generally authority cited in notes 16 & 18 supra. 
76 See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222,418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1979). 
55 N.Y.2d 41, 432 N.E.2d 592, 447 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1982). 
77 See Citizens Task Force on SOH10 v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 23 Cal. 3d 812,591 P.2d 
1236, 153 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1979). For other agency actions which can be invalidated for lack of 
an EIS, see Tri-County Taxpayers h ' n ,  Inc. v. Town Bd., 55 N.Y.2d 41, 432 N.E.2d 592, 447 
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1982) (election appropriating funds for a sewer district annulled for lack of an 
EIS). See generally N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW 5 239-m (McKinney 1974). See abo Rye Town/King 
Civic Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 442 N.Y.S.2d 67, appeal dismissed, 55 N.Y.2d 747 
(1981); Weinstein v. Nicosia, 32 Misc. 2d 246, 223 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd., 18 
A.D.2d 881, 236 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1963). 
See, e.g., County of Franklin v. Connelie, 68 A.D.2d 1000, 415 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1979); In re 
Hopkins, 99 Misc. 2d 216, 415 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1979). 
See, e.g., County of Franklin v. Connelie, 68 A.D.2d 1000, 415 N.Y.S2d 110 (1979). 
Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215,430 N.Y.S.2d 440 
(1980). 
Friends of Monmouth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 
761 (1972). 
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serve to guide SEQRA. California courts regularly require application 
of the EIS process in many varied circumstances. CEQA applies to 
power plant authorizations, to actions with environmental impacts 
outside the jurisdiction of the entity preparing the EIS, to annexa- 
tion of land by a municipality, to permits for subdivisions, and to 
other local zoning  decision^."^ Comparably broad rulings are found in 
the State of Wash ing t~n .~~  
Ministerial actions may be exempt from SEQRA," but they must 
be identified as being ministerial beyond cavil. Washington has found 
it difficult to draw the line between ministerial and major actions. In 
Eastlake Community Council u. Roanoke Associates,B6 Washington's 
highest court ruled that where a building permit renewal was 
"mandatory" no EIS was needed, but where the renewal was "non- 
duplicative" and discretionary and there was no prior environmental 
review, then an EIS was required. Care must be taken to define the 
"ministerial" e x e m p t i ~ n . ~ ~  
The California courts have furthered CEQA's remedial purposes by 
restricting exemptions through narrow constructions7 and by declin- 
ing to find implied  exemption^.^^ Where discretion is involved in an 
agency decision, there is usually an opportunity to mitigate environ- 
mental harm. For such action, an EIS is required. 
OD See, e.g., Desert Envtl. Conservation Ass'n v. Public Utile. Comm'n, 8 Cal. 3d 739, 505 
P.2d 223,106 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1973) (power plants); County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 
108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973) (outside jurisdiction); Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 37 
Cal. App. 3d 842, 112 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974), aff'd, 13 Cal. 2d 483,531 P.2d 783, 119 Cal. Rptr. 
215 (1975) (annexation); People v. Country of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67 
(1974) (general land use plan); Rosenthal v. Board of Supervisors, 44 Cal. App. 3d 815,119 Cal. 
Rptr. 282 (1975) (local rezoning). 
Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wash. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (en banc) (subdivision plan approval); 
Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475,513 P.2d 36 (1973) (en 
banc) (condominium); Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 
166 (1973) (en banc) (withdrawal of water); Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of 
Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973) (municipal grading permit). 
6 N.Y.C.R.R. 1 617.13(d) (1979) (exempting routine and maintenance activity). 
82 Wash. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973) (en banc). See also Loveless v. Yantie, 82 Wash. 2d 
754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973) (en banc) (on exemption.for ministerial actions). 
See Note, Aftermath; Friends of Mammoth and the Amended California Environmental 
Quality Act, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q., 349, 386-87 (1973) (critical discussion of California case law). 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 59 Cal. App. 3d 959, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 172 (1976). 
Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 553 P.2d 537, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1976); Inter- 
national Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Board of Supervisors, 116 Cal. App. 3d 
265, 171 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1981). 
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2. The Designation of a Lead Agency 
Where a project must be approved by more than one agency, it is 
essential for the effective and efficient operation of the EIS process 
that, as early as possible, one be identified as the agency responsible 
for conducting the environmental reviewn8@ This is the "lead" agency. 
Not only must one agency assume that burden of EIS responsibility, 
but other agencies must assist it in doing so. The need for efficient 
execution of this stage led to amendments of CEQA aimed at as- 
signing the burden of EIS resp~nsibility.~~ 
3. The Decision to Require an EIS 
Guidance from other states can be of assistance in determining 
when and whether an EIS is needed under SEQRA. ' ' ~ e ~ m e n k -  
tion,"@l or the division of what would be a Type I action into small 
bits and pieces, each with insignificant impact, is usually not al- 
Even if the action would have a Type I classification, a deci- 
sion must still be made as to when in time the action exists. A mere 
plan to act may not trigger ran EIS.88 If an agency is unsure whether 
an act is advanced enough to require an EIS under CEQA, it can 
order tests and research."' This goes beyond the administrative envi- 
ronmental assessment form (EAF) now used under SEQRA. 
The general criteria for deciding when an impact is significant, so 
as to require an EIS, have been reviewed often. In Norway Hill Pres- 
ervation and Protection Association o. King County C o u n ~ i l , ~ ~  
Washington's Supreme Court defined "significantly" as "whenever 
more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a 
6 N.Y.C.R.R. 8 617 (1979). 
Pridgeon, Anderson & Delphey, State Environmental Policy Acts: A Survey of Recent 
Developments, 2 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 427-28 (1977). 
Segmentation is the term derived from the practice of dividing highways into small linking 
units to avoid reviewing the entire route. See, eg., River v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 359 
F. Supp. 611, 634 (1973), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973). 
See, e.g., Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Arcadia City Council, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712, 117 Cal. Rptr. 
96, 105 (1974). The very fact of exercising discretion in making this decision may mean that the 
EIS must be done. Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Waah. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973). 
See, e.g., No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 
(1974); Lake County Energy Council v. County of Lake, 70 Cal. App. 3d 851,139 Cal. Rptr. 176 
(1977); County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973). 
*' See, e.g., Society for Cal. Archaeology v. County of Butte, 65 Cal. App. 3d 832, 135 Cal. 
Rptr. 679 (1977); People v. County of Kern, 62 Cal. App. 3d 761, 133 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1976). 
*' 87 Wash. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976). 
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reasonable pr~babili ty."~~ Factors considered by the court were the 
size of the project, the type of environmental change, and the classifi- 
cation of the project under SEPA.e7 If no EIS had been prepared and 
the action was significant, then even extensive prior discussion and 
the attachment of the protective conditions would be insufEcient ac- 
cording to the court.BB The court held that SEPA mandates full dis- 
closure and investigation before decisionmaking precisely to ensure 
that adequate protective measures could be taken." Ultimately, 
whether an EIS is required is a mixed question of law and fact. A 
rule of reasonableness should govern review of this determination.lo0 
4. The Draft EIS and Consideration of Alternatives 
The DEIS is intended to be a comprehensive and fair review of all 
the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action. The central 
analytic tool for highlighting these impacts is a discussion of alterna- 
tives. By requiring a discussion of the effect of no action or a modi- 
fied action, the decisionmaker identifies a way to avoid adverse im- 
pacts and is less reluctant to describe the range of realistically 
possible adverse effects in a candid fashion. 
The EIS process must consider all aspects of a proposed action. 
Under CEQA, close scrutiny is given to such consideration. Thus, in 
County of Inyo v. Los Angeles,lol the court found a number of defi- 
ciencies in the consideration of alternatives and impacts. The court 
found two major deficiencies in the environmental impact report 
(EIR).'OP First, the court held that consideration of alternatives must 
Id. at 278,552 P.2d a t  680 (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661,673-74 & n.16 
(9th Cir. 1975)). 
Id. at 275-76 & n.8, 552 P.2d at 679 & 681 n.8. 
Id. The court noted earlier that it chose the "clearly erroneous" administrative standard of 
review because SEPA's intent could easily be frustrated by declarations of no significance. Id. 
at 276, 552 P.2d at 679. 
Id. at 275,552 P.2d at 679. The court recognized that the "most important aspect of SEPA 
is the consideration of environmental values . . . [SEPA] 'is an attempt by the people to shape 
their future environment by deliberation, not default.' " Id. at 272, 552 P.2d at 677 (quoting 
Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 118, 508 P.2d 166, 172 (1973)). 
loo Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 79 Wis. 2d 409, 256 N.W.2d 149 
(1977). For a similar ruling under SEQRA, see Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. 
Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1980). 
lo' 71 Cal. App. 3d 185,139 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1977). See abo Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. 
City Council, 83 Cal. App. 3d 515, 147 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1978). 
lo' An EIR is an environmental impact report and is the equivalent of SEQRA's EIS. Com- 
pare CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 5 21100 (Deering 1981) with N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 8-0101 to 
-0117 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). 
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include a "no project" alternative.lo8 Second, the court held that the 
EIR was void because it was based on an inaccurate project descrip- 
tion.lO' The court noted that the revised EIR described a small scale 
groundwater project and that the final EIR dealt with large scale 
phases of the City's aqueduct management program.'06 The County 
of Inyo court recognized that the interim EIR's may be based on new 
insights requiring revision. I t  refused, however, to validate the project 
when its scope was known in advance but was deliberately misstated 
to confuse the public.'OB The court reemphasized that the scope of 
the project and all reasonable alternatives must be included in the 
EIR.'07 
An alternative can be feasible and merit review in the EIS even 
though the applicant would reject undertaking such a course.10B An 
alternative must, therefore, be examined in the EIS even though the 
agency may later make an independent decision as to whether or not 
to make the alternative a condition of approval as a form of mitiga- 
tion to comply with SEQRA's substantive mandate discussed below. 
The scope of the EIS must include secondary and cumulative 
impacts.lo9 
One useful technique, first developed in Massach~setts,"~ is "scop- 
ing," a means of focusing on important issues and streamlining the 
method of review. When NEPA was enacted, it did not include a 
scoping provision but the revised implementing regulations now ad- 
dress the issue."' SEQRA has no specific provision on scoping, but 
the concept can be read into the Act."% Scoping is especially useful a t  
lo' County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 193, 203, 139 Cal. Rptr. 396, 
401, 408. 
I M  Id. a t  192-93, 199-200, 139 Cal. Rptr. at  401, 406. 
I0"d. at 190-91, 199, 139 Cal. Rptr. at  399-400, 406. 
Id. at 199-200, 139 Cal. Rptr. at  406. 
lor Id. 
lo' Arcata Redwood Co. v. State Bd. of Forestry, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) ll 20,755 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1977). 
'Oe Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 283-84, 529 P.2d 1017, 1030, 
118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 262 (1975). Cf. Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, supra note 22 at  153- 
56 (describing the Wisconsin experience). 
no MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 30, 88 61-62H (MichieLaw Co-op 1973 Supp. 1981). 
"I 40 C.F.R. 8 1501.7 (1981). See also notes 131-32 and accompanying text infra. 
11' N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 8 8-0109(2) lists specific considerations to be included in the 
EIS and provides that it "should not contain more detail than is appropriate." Id. This section 
also provides that "agencies may make their own independent judgment of the scope, contents 
and adequacy of an environmental impact statement." Id. 8 8-0109(3). DEC's implementing 
regulations provide that impact statements should not be "encyclopedic," 6 N.Y.C.R.R. 8 
617.14(b) (1979), and "should not contain more detail than is appropriate considering the na- 
ture and magnitude of the proposed action and the significance of its potential impacts." Id. 8 
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the beginning of the EIS process where a scoping conference is often 
held with the lead agency.l18 
5. The Final EIS Proposals for Mitigation 
Not only must an FEIS under SEQRA fully review adverse envi- 
ronmental effects and identify alternatives, but viable steps for miti- 
gating those effects must also be discussed. The final agency decision 
should make appropriate mitigation a condition for project approval. 
The failure to select a feasible alternative which would avert envi- 
ronmental harm gives the agency the option in some jurisdictions to 
deny the requested approval.ll' This is ultimate mitigation. There is 
authority under CEQA that an agency need only impose feasible mit- 
igation, not the most environmentally superior alternative.ll5 With 
SEQRA's social and economic compatibility provisions,116 this CEQA 
rule may be appropriate in New York. 
SEQRA, unlike NEPA, expressly embodies the requirement of sub- 
stantive mitigation."' As in Washington, this means that a permit 
may be denied on the grounds that it would degrade the environment 
excessively in contravention of SEQRA's stewardship responsibili- 
ties.l18 Among all the little NEPA's, Minnesota's statute probably 
imposes the greatest substantive burden."@ 
Even after an action has gone forward without a valid EIS or ab- 
sent all feasible mitigation, the SEQRA duty to assure that feasible 
mitigation be considered and applied must be discharged. This may 
mean retrofitting a project. Both Californialao and New Yorklal 
courts have reached this EIS implication in their rulings. 
617.14(c). 
In fact, DEC's regulations governing procedures for DEC permit approvals strongly rec- 
ommend th.at the applicant request a scoping conference where an EIS is necessary. Id. 5 621.3 
(1977). 
lL4  In  re City of White Bear Lake, 311 Minn. 146, 247 N.W.2d 901 (1976). 
11' Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. City Council, 83 Cal. App. 3d 515, 147 Cal. Rptr. 842 
(1978). This ruling is criticized in Note, CEQA's Substantive Mandate Clouded by Appellate 
Court, 8 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) U 10,208 (1978). 
lIe N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 5 8-0109(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). 
lL7  See Gitlen, The Substantive Impact of SEQRA, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1241 (1982); Ulasewicz, 
supra note 5. As to CEQA, see Substantive Enforcement, supra note 22. 
See, e.g., Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978). 
118 State v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979). 
lS0 San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Friends of Gill, 121 Cal. App. 3d 203, 174 Cal. Rptr. 
784 (1981). 
la' Rye TownIKing Civic Ass'n v. Town of .Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 442 N.Y.S.2d 67, appeal 
dismissed, 55 N.Y.2d 747 (1981). 
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6. Standing and Judicial Review 
The entire EIS process is enforced through recourse to the courts 
by way of judicial review of the agency action. The lead agency must 
compile a careful record documenting the EIS process.1aa This record 
is the basis for determining both the procedural correctness and the 
substantive reasonableness of the agency's decision. 
Judicial review is contemplated as the principal means for enforc- 
ing agency adherence to SEQRA's stewardship responsibilitie~.~~~ 
The criteria for any citizen's standing to so enforce SEQRA is found 
in the pre-SEQRA ruling of Douglaston Civic Association v. Gal- 
vin.la4 While courts have occasionally found that the standing criteria 
of Douglaston have not been met,la5 the pattern of New York stand- 
ing cases follows the federal lead in liberally construing environmen- 
tal noneconomic interests as being of sufficient weight to accord 
standing to their champions to enforce SEQRA.lS6 In this respect, 
most jurisdictions in zoning and land use cases analogous to EIS 
cases today accord standing to civic groups.la7 
The literature on the scope of judicial review of an EIS process 
under little NEPA's has been extensively developed.la8 Since SEQRA 
relies on each state agency and local government to remake its own 
procedures to assure that its stewardship duties will be met, only the 
courts can assure that a uniform statewide process will eventually 
emerge.la8 This will take time and will ultimately call for the guiding 
hand of the court of appeals. Uniformity of EIS application will 
la' Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 
275-76,552 P.2d 674,679 (1976); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis. 2d 
409, 419, 256 N.W.2d 149, 155 (1977). 
la8 See also Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 79 Wisc. 2d 409, 256 N.W.2d 
149 (1977); authority discussed in Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, supra note 22, a t  161- 
66. The pattern was fixed under NEPA with Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United 
States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
la' 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317,364.N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974). For further discussion of standing 
to sue under SEQRA, see Crary, Procedural Issues Under SEQRA, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1211, 1211- 
23 (1982). 
"".W.A.R.E., Inc. v. North Hempstead, 81 Misc. 2d 1010, 367 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 
1975). 
la0 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also Simons v. City of Los Angeles, 100 
Cal. App. 3d 496, 161 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1979); Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Ange- 
les, 34 Cal. App. 3d 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1973); SAVE a Valuable Environment v. City of 
Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978). 
Ia7 See Annot., 8 A.L.R.4th 1087 (1981). 
"' See, e.g., Roe & Lean, supra note 22, a t  533-40. 
lag Uniformity of application has been criticized under other little NEPA's. See, e.g., Quest 
for Uniformity, supra note 22. 
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therefore be enhanced by following the precedents of sister states 
where applicable. 
Recurring patterns of new land uses and development exist 
throughout the United States. I t  is only natural, therefore, that state 
legislatures have sought to regulate and control these developments 
in similar ways. The environmental impact assessment process a t  its 
best is a technique not just to protect environmental.quality, but also 
to promote the ordered growth of society. The courts do much to ad- 
vance both wise use of natural resources and social and economic de- 
velopment by reinforcing the legislative judgment that environmental 
impact analysis shall be a part of all governmental decisionmaking in 
the federal government and in states such as New York, California 
and Washington. 
Just as the experiences under the ~assachbsetts  little NEPAISO 
gave the Council. on Environmental Quality the idea of "scoping" to 
narrow an EIS,lS1 and the NEPA regulations now include a require- 
ment for scoping,lsa so also the NEPA process can guide the states' 
little NEPA's. An evolving and symbiotic relationship exists between 
NEPA and the comparable state laws, just as there is one among the 
state enactments. 
The New York Legislature should' seek to improve. and streamline 
SEQRA by considering the strengths in other states' little NEPA's. 
For one thing, a New York oversight body, analogous to the Presi- 
dent's Council on Environmental Quality,lsS should be created to fa- 
cilitate the work of SEQRA. Such a body could exist in either the 
Department of Environmental Conservation or the Department of 
State. A similar proposal has been made for C,alif~rnia. '~~ 
In like vein, the New York courts should draw on the wealth of EIS 
case law around the nation in shaping.SEQRA. A common body of 
law, adapted mutatis mutandis for each state, now exists. The judici- 
IB0 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30, 88 61-62H (MichieLaw Co-op 1973 & Supp. 1981). 
la' See 40 C.F.R. 83 1500.4, 1501.1, 1501.4, 1501.7, 1502.9, 1506.8 (1979); [I9781 COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP., ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 396, 398 (discussing Council on 
Environmental Quality revisions to NEPA regulations). For a further discussion of scoping, see 
notes 110-13 and accompanying text supra. 
"' 40 C.F.R. 8 1501.7 (1981). 
ma 42 U.S.C. $8 4341-4347. See also Crary, supra note 124, at 1231-32. 
I" Quest for Uniformity, supra note 22, at 873-76. 
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ary can and should do much to mold this corpus of ordered common 
law which environmental impact laws make possible. 
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